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The Preemptive Effect of the OSHA Hazard
Communication Standard on State and Community
Right to Know Laws
Patrick R. Tyson*
Beginning in the late 1960s and continuing through the present,
there has been an increasing awareness of the harmful effects that many
commonly used chemicals have on living organisms and the environ-
ment. As a result, there has also developed a rising consciousness con-
cerning chemical exposure in the workplace and its effect on employees.
In many cases, workers lack knowledge of the chemicals to which they are
exposed, the effects of such exposure, or the precautions necessary for
safe handling of such chemicals. Furthermore, many manufacturers may
be ignorant of the risks involved, as little or no information may have
been provided by the chemical suppliers concerning the harmful nature
of the chemicals, especially long-term or chronic effects. Consequently,
many diseases are never properly attributed to chemical exposure, a fact
further exacerbated by the lengthy incubation period of many diseases
resulting from chemical exposure, especially cancer.
To further complicate matters, rational business considerations em-
ployed by the chemical industry require that specific identities of chemi-
cal compounds be kept secret. In many cases, it is the secrecy of
chemical elements that allows a manufacturer to gain a competitive ad-
vantage in the marketplace.
In 1970, Congress passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSH Act),I the purpose of which was "to assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the nation safe and healthful working condi-
tions .... "2 To greatly compress history, the National Institute for Oc-
cupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), an agency created under the
OSH Act, recommended that the Secretary of Labor promulgate regula-
tions requiring employers to inform employees of potentially hazardous
materials in the workplace. 3 The Secretary of Labor created the Occupa-
tional Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), an agency charged with
drafting and enforcing the necessary regulations. After an extensive
rule-making process, OSHA promulgated the Hazard Communication
Standard (OSHA Standard) in late 1983, with an effective date of May 25,
* Partner, Constangy, Brooks & Smith, Atlanta. The author served as Acting Assistant Secre-
tary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health from 1985-86, as Deputy Assistant Secretary from
1981-85 and as Counsel for state OSHA programs at the Department of Labor from 1978-81. Mr.
Tyson supervised the development of the Hazard Communication Standard and OSHA's enforce-
ment policy for the Standard. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Bryant Smith in
the preparation of this article.
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
2 Id. § 651(b).
3 S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 19-21, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 5196-98.
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1986.4 The purpose of the OSHA Standard is to inform employees of
the hazards associated with the chemical substances to which they are
exposed in the workplace. 5 Most observers agree that the OSHA Stan-
dard represents the most significant regulatory action ever taken by that
agency.
Before the agency completed the OSHA Standard, several states
passed "right to know" laws, essentially covering the same issue as the
OSHA Standard. Under the OSH Act, however, states are only free to
"[assert] jurisdiction under State law over any occupational safety or
health issue with respect to which no standard is in effect .. ."6 The anti-
thesis of this provision is the more operative law-that states are pre-
empted from asserting jurisdiction over an issue with respect to which a
standard is in effect. Congress left the states free to regulate areas be-
yond the scope of OSHA's authority (e.g., environmental matters outside
the workplace, or workplace issues for which no OSHA standard has
been promulgated). And therein lies the battle. Promulgation of the
OSHA Standard raises the question of whether, and to what extent, the
state right to know laws are preempted by the federal regulation. This
battle has been vigorously fought by both sides. At stake is the potential
for extremely burdensome state regulation balanced against the per-
ceived need for extensive dissemination of information regarding toxic
substances. OSHA and industrial interests have emphasized the goal of
consistent regulations throughout the states, a lessened burden on inter-
state commerce, and relief for regulated industries from the burden of
unnecessary and redundant regulation. The states and labor organiza-
tions have emphasized the traditional states' right to regulate health and
safety matters, as well as the states' interest in providing the most protec-
tive regulations possible, a policy fully in accord with the purpose of the
OSH Act. The conflict is further complicated by the fact that, unlike the
OSHA Standard, the state right to know laws may be drafted to protect
not only employees in the workplace, but other classes of persons as well.
Congress, in passing the OSH Act, was not concerned with burden-
ing industry, finding that any such burden would be justified in order to
provide a safe workplace. 7 Given that OSHA passed a standard involving
a particular method (e.g., container labeling) to address a particular prob-
lem (e.g., hazard communication), are state and local governments still
free under the language of the OSH Act to require additional, different,
or even identical container labeling in order to address hazards other
than employee safety and health? The following discussion will analyze
the viability of the state right to know laws in light of the federal OSHA
Standard. Included in the discussion is an examination of the state laws'
effect on interstate commerce and an analysis of court decisions on both
4 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1986).
5 Id. The OSHA Standard provides for material safety data sheets (MSDS's), container label-
ing, and employee training. It is applicable to employers in Standard Industrial Classification Codes
20 through 39 (the manufacturing sector). Id.
6 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
7 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728, 734 (3d Cir. 1985).
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implied and express preemption. This Article concludes that the state
right to know laws should, in most cases, be invalidated.
I. Commerce Clause Analysis
The primary criterion for evaluating the validity of a state lay under
the Commerce Clause is its discriminatory impact on interstate com-
merce." State laws which are facially discriminatory are those which ex-
plicitly favor in-state interests over those of other states. These statutes
will have an unconstitutional impact on interstate commerce where the
effect of any such statute is discriminatory. Only two Supreme Court
cases have invalidated facially nondiscriminatory state laws. 9 In both
cases the Court found that the laws simply placed too heavy a burden on
interstate commerce.
The first case, Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,10 involved a state law
limiting the length of trains operated within the state. The Court recog-
nized that states have the power to regulate matters of local concern,
provided that no conflicting Congressional legislation exists and that the
impact on interstate commerce is slight."i State statutes, however, may
not cause "substantial" interference with interstate commerce, nor regu-
late areas in which there is a need for national uniformity.' 2 Such a de-
termination would be based on the competing demands of state and
national interests. Under this rule of law, the Court held that the "deci-
sive question is whether in the circumstances the total effect of the law as
a safety measure in reducing accidents and casualties is so slight or prob-
lematical as not to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate
commerce free from interferences which seriously impede it and subject
it to local regulation which does not have a uniform effect ... ."3 The
Court stressed the need for a sufficient factual basis to determine "the
relative weights of the state and national interests involved" and to " 'af-
ford a sure basis' for an informed judgment."'14
On the facts before it, the Court found the "safety measure [of the
state law] at most slight and dubious."iS In fact, the Court noted evi-
dence that the state regulation actually increased accidents because of
the increase in the number of trains that had to be run through the
state.16 The statute's impact on interstate commerce was also extensive,
8 The commerce clause analysis is based on Professor Sedler's article, The Negative Commerce
Clause as a Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of Constitutional Structure, 31
WAYNE L. REV. 885 (1985).
9 Aside from the two cases cited, the Supreme Court has upheld every facially nondiscrimina-
tory state regulation which has been challenged.
10 325 U.S. 761 (1944).
11 Id. at 767.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 770 (quoting Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 8 (1942)).
14 Id. at 775-76.
15 Id. at 779.
16 Id. The Court distinguished prior cases involving state regulations which required full train
crews. The Court found that such regulations did not create an adverse impact on interstate com-
merce. Cases involving highway regulation concerned regulation of a "field over which the state has
a far more extensive control than over interstate railroads." Id. at 783 (citing Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry.
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both in terms of cost and effect beyond the state borders.1 7 Ninety-three
percent of the freight trains and ninety-five percent of the passenger
trains moving through Arizona and affected by its laws were moving in-
terstate. 18 The Arizona statute, therefore, impacted far more on inter-
state than intrastate commerce.19 Consequently, it was struck down as an
impermissible burden on interstate commerce.
The second case in which the Court invalidated a facially nondis-
criminatory state regulation was Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines.20 The Court
held that an Illinois requirement that trucks have contoured mudflaps
was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. The Court
found that the requirement substantially burdened interstate com-
merce2 ' not only by greatly increasing the cost of doing business but also
by conflicting with the requirements of other states, "making it neces-
sary, say, for an interstate carrier to shift its cargo to differently designed
vehicles once the state line was reached." 22 Indeed, at the time Arkansas
required a mudflap design incongruous with the Illinois reguirement.
Thus, truck owners travelling through both states had to change flaps or
vehicles every time one or the other state border was crossed, necessitat-
ing additional time, labor, and expense.23
The Court paid particular attention to the statute's interference with
"interlining" operations, by which through freight is transferred from
one shipper to another by transferring the entire trailer. The Court
found that the Illinois statute would seriously disrupt this process, nearly
an exclusive interstate practice. 24 The failure of Illinois to establish that
the state requirement conclusively promoted safety and the existence of a
compelling special local condition was a determining factor in the
Court's invalidation of the statute. 25
Of the many cases upholding nondiscriminatory local laws that bur-
den interstate commerce, Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit is exem-
plary. 26 When the City of Detroit instituted proceedings against the
defendant's ships for violation of its Smoke Abatement Code, the ship-
owners appealed on grounds of preemption and the impermissible bur-
Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453 (1911) and South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Bamwell Bros., 303
U.S. 177 (1938)).
17 Id. at 774-75. The Court noted that compliance with the Arizona law frequently required
trains to be broken up and reformed far outside Arizona's border.
18 Id. at 771.
19 The Court further noted the potential for multitudinous and conflicting state legislation,
which would interfere with the Congressional goal of promoting adequate, economical, and efficient
railway transportation service. Id. at 773 (citing Interstate Commerce Act, preamble, 54 Stat. 898,
899 (1940)).
20 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
21 Id. at 530. Changing mudflaps would require two to four hours labor. Moreover, since weld-
ing would be required, trailers with explosive or flammable material would have to be unloaded. Id.
at 527.
22 Id. at 526.
23 Id. The Court stated: "If we had here only a question whether the cost of adjusting an inter-
state operation to these new local safety regulations prescribed by Illinois unduly burden interstate
commerce, we would have to sustain the law.... The same results would obtain ifiwe had to resolve
the much discussed issues of safety presented in this case." Id.
24 Id. at 527-28.
25 Id. at 528-29. Indeed, there was evidence of its creating safety problems.
26 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
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den on interstate commerce. 27 The Court began its Commerce Clause
analysis by recognizing that the City of Detroit, pursuant to its police
power, had a legitimate interest in implementing the ordinance. 28 The
Court also noted that the exercise of a state's police power may be per-
missible even though such exercise indirectly affects interstate com-
merce.29 The Court stated, however, with citations to Bibb, Southern
Pacific, and Hall v. De Cuir,30 that "a state may not impose a burden which
materially affects interstate commerce in an area where uniformity of reg-
ulation is necessary."'3 1 State regulation, based on its police power,
which does not excessively burden interstate commerce or disrupt uni-
formity may stand. 32 The Court found that such were the facts before it,
characterizing the statute as one "of general application, designed to bet-
ter the health and welfare of the community."33 Because the record con-
tained no evidence of the existence of competing or conflicting local
regulations with which to link a burden on interstate commerce, the
Court upheld the regulation as constitutionally permissible.34
Several of the Commerce Clause cases make reference to finding
nondiscriminatory alternatives to particular state regulations which will
be less burdensome on interstate commerce. 35 However, these cases de-
pend on a threshold finding of discrimination against interstate com-
merce. 36 Absent this showing, the courts have not interfered with the
legislative judgment. The articulated balancing of putative local benefit
against burdens on interstate commerce simply does not happen under
the Commerce Clause where the statute in question is truly nondiscrimi-
natory, either facially or in effect.
The state right to know laws at issue are clearly not facially discrimi-
natory. However, in spite of the goals advanced by the state govern-
ments in promulgating the regulations, a finding of an unconstitutional
discriminatory impact is possible. Unfortunately, although they address
the principle, the legacy of Southern Pacific and Bibb offers little real hope
in the way of precedents, as the regulations in both cases were particu-
larly nonsensical. The facts revealed that the regulations might well have
contravened their stated goals of improving railroad and highway safety;
at best, they did little or nothing to improve it. Instead, the success of a
commerce clause argument is contingent upon counsel's ability to pro-
duce facts sufficient to establish that the statutes have the effect of dis-
criminating against interstate commerce. For example, such a factual
basis could be developed by demonstrating the costs and negative impact
of the state law on out-of-state companies subject to dissimilar labeling
27 The Smoke Abatement Code was a precursor to modern environmental regulations.
28 362 U.S. at 442.
29 Id. at 444.
30 95 U.S. 485 (1877) (holding state regulation of passenger placement aboard riverboats in
interstate commerce impermissible).
31 362 U.S. at 444.
32 Id. at 448.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
36 Id. at 336 (citing Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977)).
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requirements of various states, as well as the confusion it may cause em-
ployees who must interpret the differing federal and state required labels
on a particular container.3 7 Many of the arguments derived from an
analysis of the preeemption issues will also be applicable.3 8
II. Implied Preemption
Congress promulgated the OSH Act specifically to address health
and safety issues in the workplace; it did not expressly preempt other
health and safety measures enacted by the states clearly unrelated to the
workplace, such as housing codes.3 9 A state law can be preempted by a
federal law or regulation either expressly or impliedly. Express preemp-
tion occurs when Congress, by legislating comprehensively, occupies an
entire field of regulation and has thereby "left no room for the states to
supplement" federal law.40 Implied preemption occurs when a state law
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress." 41
In Chemical Specialties Manufacturers Association, Inc. v. Lowery,42 a case
involving the Federal Hazardous Substance Act (FHSA), Judge Friendly
predicted that the preemptive effect of federal regulations would in-
crease. "[W]ith federal laws taking over many fields previously regulated
by the states or not regulated at all, it is quite conceivable that, in order
to avoid undue burdens on interstate commerce, the Supreme Court may
move toward a somewhat broader position on preemption." 43 This lan-
guage is certainly pertinent to the OSH Act and the field which it covers;
the applicable federal regulation concerns safety and health matters, an
area historically left to state control. This historic deference to the
states, however, arose at a time when there were few hazardous chemicals
shipped in interstate commerce and there were few, if any, state regula-
tions in existence. As such, neither potential nor actual burdens on in-
terstate commerce were a problem with regard to chemicals.. In contrast,
today scores of hazardous chemicals move in interstate commerce, to
such extent that any state regulating these chemicals is apt to impose
some burden on interstate commerce.
According to OSHA, the purpose of the Hazard Communication
Standard is to ensure that the hazards of all chemicals produced or im-
ported in any OSHA-regulated state or territory is communicated to em-
ployers and employees within the manufacturing sector "by means of
comprehensive hazard communication programs, which are to include
container labeling and other forms of warning. . . .,44
State laws which require hazard labeling for reasons different from
those articulated by OSHA (e.g., notifying fire fighters of container's con-
37 See i fra text accompanying notes 39-49.
38 See infra notes 39-83 and accompanying text.
39 Any reference to "states" is intended to include their political subdivisions as well.
40 Fidelity Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cucsta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
41 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
42 452 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1971).
43 Id. at 440.
44 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a)(1) (1986).
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tents) but apply to containers covered by the OSHA Standard can be an
obstacle to effectuating the federal protections. The effect of the
proliferation of required labels on a given container is that employees
suffer from an "information overload," and consequently are less likely
to receive an adequate warning than under a single labeling scheme.45
To ensure a more effective method to communicate hazards, OSHA
promulgated a hazard communication program consisting of three inter-
dependent provisions: Labeling of workplace containers, material safety
data sheets (MSDS's), and employee training. Each of the provisions is
integrated with the others "to ensure that employees will receive as much
information as needed concerning hazards in their workplaces and that
this information will be presented to them in a usable, readily accessible
form." 46 The label requirement is intended to provide an immediate
warning, while the MSDS provides more detailed information regarding
the hazard. 47 OSHA selected an approach by which the "employer could
use common terms [on the labels], familiar to employees, while still pro-
viding them with more extensive information, including specific chemical
identities, on the material safety data sheet." 48 OSHA's concern that em-
ployees would not be able to assimilate all the chemical names or identifi-
cation numbers if they were included on the labeling led to abbreviated
labeling requirements, thus avoiding the danger of information
overload. 49
To establish implied preemption, it is necessary to prove that the
different labeling schemes in force cause conflict and confusion. Such
arguments are then weighed against the goals sought to be advanced by
the state laws (e.g., protecting the public and the environment as opposed
to protecting employees in the workplace). The Supreme Court, in ana-
lyzing federal regulations, will examine the federal enforcement agency's
position on preemption, especially where the agency opines that the fed-
eral regulations were not intended to preempt state law.50 Indeed, in
this situation the Court has characterized an agency's position as "dis-
positive." 5 1 An agency's stand on preemption may not be considered as
equally dispositive, however, where the agency favors preemption. 52
Where Congress has directed an administrator to exercise his discre-
tion, his judgments are subject to judicial review only to determine
whether he has exceeded his statutory authority or acted arbitrar-
ily.... If [h]is choice represents a reasonable accommodation of con-
flicting policies that were committed to the agency's care by the
45 48 Fed. Reg. 53,301 (1983). Recognizing the consequences of information overload, OSHA
considered and rejected a plan which would have required "chemical identity" labeling listing either
specific elements of a chemical or the chemical identity of hazardous substances in a container and
their Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) numbers. Id. at 53,291-92 & 53,302.
46 Id. at 53,281-82.
47 Id. at 53,301.
48 Id.
49 47 Fed. Reg. 12,092 (1983).
50 Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985).
51 Id. at 714 (held in favor of a state health regulation; prevailing presumption in favor of state
health and safety laws).
52 Id. at 714-15 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984)).
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statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or
its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress
would have sanctioned. 53
Congress unquestionably granted OSHA the power to act to assure safe
working environments; equally apparent is that such was OSHA's intent
in promulgating the Hazard Communication Standard. OSHA has stated
its intention that the OSHA Standard preempt state law. The justifica-
tion is to lessen the confusion multiple labeling causes employees and
the needless regulatory burden on employers. State laws which impose
greater burdens on the agency's enforcement mechanism clearly contra-
vene this administrative judgment.
The community right to know laws which call for essentially the
same information as the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard are of
dubious benefit. When these state laws call for an entirely different label-
ing requirement than that imposed by the OSHA Standard, without re-
quiring dissimilar information, such laws impose a heavy burden on the
manufacturer which must comply with both. This extra burden is need-
less when the community agencies concerned could acquire the same in-
formation through the OSHA Standard. Even though the OSHA
Standard is expressly intended to protect employees from hazards in the
workplace, it nevertheless accomplishes, in a wider sense, just what its
name implies: hazard communication. The information required by the
OSHA Standard is available not only to employees, but also to fire fight-
ers and concerned neighbors alike. The OSHA Standard must be com-
plied with regardless of state law. Where state law and the OSHA
Standard overlap, the benefit conferred by the state law is meaningless,
irrespective of the burden it creates.
The issue, therefore, more accurately stated, is the extent to which
the benefit conferred by the state law above and beyond the OSHA Stan-
dard outweighs the burden such law imposes on interstate commerce.
Courts which have resolved challenges to overlapping state right to know
laws created presumptions in favor of upholding the state laws. The
courts have refused to address a claim that the state laws impermissibly
burden interstate commerce where no factual evidence was presented to
substantiate such claim. 54 Interestingly, the same courts have found that
the benefit of the state law to the community is "direct and obvious,"
notwithstanding the absence of empirical data. In fact, the "direct and
obvious" benefits of the states' overlapping laws are likely not substan-
tially more beneficial than the federal OSHA Standard already in effect.
It seems that the courts have analyzed the state right to know laws as if
the federal OSHA Standard had no effect on the area which it regulates.
Admittedly, the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard addresses
workplace rather than environmental problems. If the analysis of the
right to know laws focuses solely on this intent, then the OSHA Standard
53 Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984) (citing Fidelity Fed. Savings &
Loan Ass'n v. Dc la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982)).
54 See, e.g., Manufacturers Ass'n ofTri-County v. Knepper, 623 F. Supp. 1066, 1076 (M.D. Pa.
1985).
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has no effect on the right to know laws. However, "when considering the
purpose of a challenged statute, a court is not bound by '[t]he name,
description or characterization given it by the legislature or the courts of
the State,' but will determine for itself the practical impact of the law." 55
Where the OSHA Standard and the state law require substantially the
same disclosure from a manufacturer by means of two different labeling
schemes, listing requirements, and the like, the courts should require the
states to incorporate the OSHA Standard into their right to know laws.
Such a ruling would avoid redundancy in regulation and uphold the
Supreme Court's mandate that if "a legitimate local purpose is found,
then the . . .extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it
could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities." 56
Although many states argue that their own laws provide more protection
than that provided by the OSHA Standard, the argument ignores the bal-
ancing test articulated by the courts. No state has mounted empirical
evidence which establishes that a separate state labeling scheme for haz-
ardous substances will result in more protection for communities or the
environment surrounding chemical plants than would simply legislating
that the information required by the OSHA Standard shall be provided
to members of the community. Absent such proof, the increased burden
on interstate commerce should outweigh the local interest in providing
information on hazardous substances through the state right to know
laws.
When OSHA promulgated the Hazard Communication Standard the
agency expressly stated its intent to deal comprehensively with the issue
of hazard communication and to preempt all state right to know laws
addressing the same subject. The question of whether OSHA has the
authority to preempt such state laws was initially decided by the Third
Circuit in United Steelworkers of America v. 4uchter.57 The court ruled that
the Hazard Communication Standard, to the extent that it was valid as a
section 6 standard,58 applied "to the exclusion of state disclosure laws
55 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (quoting LaCoste v. Louisiana Dept. of Con-
servation, 263 U.S. 545, 550 (1924)).
56 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
57 763 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1985).
58 As the petitioners had challenged the court of appeals jurisdiction over the judicial review of
the OSHA Standard, it was necessary for the court to determine whether the Hazard Communica-
tion Standard was a § 6 standard or a § 8 regulation. Jurisdiction over challenges to the validity of
§ 6 standards is vested in the courts of appeals. 763 F.2d at 733 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1982)).
Section 8 regulations are reviewable in the district courts. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1982)). The
court noted that a § 6 standard will preempt a state law until the state obtains approval of the law
from the Secretary of Labor. Because the grant of such approval shifts the financial burden of en-
forcement from the federal government to the state, it is unlikely that states would seek approval. Id.
at 734 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 667(c)(5) (1982)). In contrast, a § 8 regulation does not necessarily pre-
empt state laws.
In resolving the issue, the court adopted the test set forth in Louisiana Chem. Ass'n v. Bingham.
657 F.2d 777, 782-83 (5th Cir. 1981) for identifying standards: "[Wlhether the challenged rule rea-
sonably purports to correct a particular significant risk or instead is merely an enforcement or detec-
tion procedure designed to further the goals of the Act generally.' 763 F.2d at 735. The court
observed that the OSHA Standard is aimed at "eliminating the specific hazard that employees han-
dling hazardous substances will be more likely to suffer impairment to their health if they are igno-
rant of the contents of those substances." Id. The court also noted the Secretary of Labor's finding
[Vol. 62: 10 10
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which have not been approved in accordance with [the OSH Act]." 59
The express language of section eighteen of the OSH Act mandated the
conclusion. 60 The court also found that the issue of the OSHA Stan-
dard's preemptive effect outside the manufacturing sector was not ripe
for review and it limited its holding to state disclosure laws concerning
employees in the manufacturing sector.
The Auchter court next addressed the validity of the OSHA Standard
itself.6' The court held that the Secretary's decision to limit the OSHA
Standard's application to only the manufacturing industries was not sup-
ported by thefactual record. The court found that one employee might
receive the same toxic exposure as another, and yet be denied any warn-
ing under the OSHA Standard simply because he worked in a nonmanu-
facturing sector industry. 62 The court rejected the Secretary's argument
that section 6(g) of the OSH Act gave him absolute discretion in rule-
making priorities. 63 The court held that the Secretary's priority setting
was reviewable under section 6(f) of the act and found that "once a stan-
dard had been promulgated, . . the Secretary may exclude a particular
industry only if he informs the reviewing court, not merely that the sector
selected for coverage presents greater hazards, but also why it is not fea-
sible for the same standard to be applied in other sectors where workers
are exposed to similar hazards."' 64 The court's difficulty with the Secre-
tary's decision arose from the failure to explain why coverage of workers
outside the manufacturing sector would have seriously impeded the rule-
making process. 65 The court directed the Secretary to reconsider the ap-
that risk of harm can be greatly reduced by direct warning to employees who are in the best position
to assure that dangerous substances are handled in the safest possible manner. Id. (citing 47 Fed.
Reg. 12,122 (1982)). The court also relied on the actual language of § G of the Act, which directs
the Secretary of Labor to promulgate "standards" which "prescribe the use of labels or other appro-
priate forms of warning as are necessary to insure that employees are apprised of all hazards to
which they are exposed .... " 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(7) (1982). Finally, the court stated that the inter-
pretation by the agency charged with its implementation should be afforded some degree of defer-
ence. The Secretary of Labor classified the OSHA Communication Standard as a § 6 standard.
After reviewing the factors, the court concluded that the Hazard Communication Standard was a § 6
standard. 763 F.2d at 735.
59 763 F.2d at 735.
60 Id. at 734 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 667(c)(5) (1982)).
61 The court cited the five step analysis it had earlier established for reviewing standards
promulgated pursuant to § 6(f) of the OSH Act, but failed to specifically apply the approach. Id. at
736 (citing Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfgr. v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1160 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 973 (1975)). The five point analysis can be summarized as follows:
(a) determining whether the Secretary's notice of the proposed rule-making ade-
quately informed interested persons of the action taken;
(b) determining whether the Secretary's promulgation adequately sets forth reasons
for his action;
(c) determining whether the statement of reasons reflects consideration of factors rele-
vant under the statute;
(d) determining whether presently available alternatives were at least considered; and
(c) if the Secretary's determination is based in whole or in part on factual matters sub-
ject to evidentiary development, whether the substantial evidence in the record as a whole
supports the determination.
62 763 F.2d at 736-37.
63 Id. at 737-38.
64 Id. (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189. 1309-10 (D.C. Cir.). cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981)).
65 Id. at 739.
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plication of the OSHA Standard to nonmanufacturing industries and to
order that its scope be expanded unless he could show cause why such
industries could not or should not be covered.66
The next case dealing with the preemptive effect of the OSHA Stan-
dard was New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey.67 The court, in
Hughey, held that section 18 of the OSH Act provides both a broad grant
of power to the states and a limit on the exercise of that power. Section
18(a) was found to "bar the exercise of state jurisdiction over issues ad-
dressed by an OSHA standard, even where the state law may arguably be
more stringent or where OSHA has not explicitly addressed a provi-
sion." 68 The New Jersey right to know law and regulations were
designed to protect not only workers but also inhabitants of the state
who live near industrial sites or other facilities, and to enable fire and
health officials to protect the community from the health risks of hazard-
ous substances. However, the court found that the right to know legisla-
tion dealt with precisely the same subjects in the workplace as those
regulated by the OSHA Standard and, therefore, clearly asserted juris-
diction over occupational safety and health issues governed by the fed-
eral standard. Consequently, section 18(b) of the OSH Act mandated
submission of the state law and regulations implementing it to the Secre-
tary of Labor for approval. The district court ruled that the state law was
not insulated from the preemptive provisions of the OSH Act simply be-
cause it afforded protections beyond health. 69
The plaintiffs argued that the nonexclusion of nonmanufacturing
sector employers represented a deliberate decision by OSHA that such
employers should not be subject to hazard communication regulations,
or in the alternative, that the potential issuance of a federal standard reg-
ulating such employers should prospectively preempt state regulations.
The court found "[n]either argument ... at all persuasive," ruling that
section 18(a) affirmatively confers jurisdiction on the states to deal with
any occupational safety or health issue as to which no OSHA standard is
in effect. 70 Federal approval of state occupational safety and health stan-
dards under section 18(b) is required only when a federal standard on
the subject "has been promulgated. ' 7' Because no federal standard was
in effect governing employers in the nonmanufacturing sectors, the court
found that federal approval of state regulation governing such areas was
not required.
The court also stated that although New Jersey could enact legisla-
tion and regulate employers in order to achieve nonworkplace objectives,
the nonworkplace regulatory plan at issue was superimposed upon a reg-
ulatory foundation covering precisely the same occupational health and
safety issues as are the subject of the OSHA Standard. The court stated:
"The workplace and non-workplace regulatory schemes are inextricably
66 Id.
67 600 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.J.), aff'd in part, red in part, 774 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1985).
68 Id. at 618.
69 Id. at 618-19 (citing Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637. 651-52 (1971)).
70 Id. at 621.
71 Id.
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intertwined. The fact that this regulatory base also serves other ends
does not save it from preemption. To hold otherwise would permit
ready nullification of the [section] 18 preemption provision." 72 Thus,
the New Jersey right to know act was found preempted in its entirety, as
it applied to manufacturing sector employers, but not with regard to
other employers. 73
On appeal to the Third Circuit, the district court's preemption hold-
ing was cut down significantly. First, the court of appeals held that the
provision of the New Jersey act, which required completion and distribu-
tion of environmental hazard surveys, was not preempted by the federal
standard insofar as it addressed "reporting of environmental hazards to
agencies concerned with public health and safety, a matter not governed
by OSHA standards."'74 The court remanded for trial the issue of
whether "New Jersey's imposition of the environmental hazard labeling
requirements in the manfacturing sector, not for the purpose of protect-
ing workers, but in the interest of firefighters, police officers, and the
general public, does in fact stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of
the purposes of the federal standard .... ."75 The remand was necessary
in light of the deficient factual record. The court ruled that the New
Jersey law must yield if it was found to so stand as a matter of law.
The next district court to consider the preemptive effect of the
OSHA Standard was also in the Third Circuit and was therefore bound
by the Hughey ruling. In Manufacturers Association of Ti-County v. Knepper,76
the court addressed Pennsylvania's right to know law. The court ana-
lyzed not only the preemptive effect of the state law, but also examined
whether the state law imposed an excessive burden on interstate com-
merce. In response to the plaintiff's contention that the right to know
act violated the commerce clause, the court, citing Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc. ,77 held that the state law met the Supreme Court's requirement that
a statute "operat[e] evenhandedly." 78 Additionally, the court found that
the plaintiff manufacturers had failed to demonstrate that the state law
would burden interstate commerce to such an extent as to outweigh any
local benefit. The court also noted such safety regulations are entitled to
"a strong presumption of validity." 79 Because the plaintiffs failed to
proffer evidence regarding the state law's burden on interstate com-
merce, the court held that the alleged impact was merely speculative.
The benefits to the community, to workers, and to others were tangible
and direct. The burden, therefore, did not outweigh the benefit. The
plaintiff also argued that because the Department of Labor and Industry
had been designated to enforce the environmental aspects of the Penn-
sylvania statute, the state law must have necessarily been intended to reg-
72 Id. at 622.
73 Id. For a discussion of express preemption, see hfra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
74 New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 774 F.2d 587, 595 (3d Cir. 1985).
75 Id. at 596.
76 623 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1985).
77 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
78 Knepper, 623 F. Supp. at 1076.
79 Id. (quoting Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways, 450 U.S. 662 (1981)).
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ulate occupational health and safety. The law therefore would be
preempted. The court disagreed. "[I]t is the purpose of the statute
which is critical, not the agency selected to implement the law. Clearly
Section 7 303(g) is concerned with the protection of the public and is not
an attempt to regulate safety." 80 The Knepper court, like others, looked at
the factual basis for an implied preemption argument and found such
facts unsupportive.
III. Express Preemption
The preceding discussion reveals the extent to which a court will
ignore the plain language of a statute in order to achieve a desired objec-
tive. It is the doctrine of express preemption, however, which logically
should govern the Hazard Communication Standard preemption issue.
This fact was recognized by the Third Circuit in Auchter and also by the
district court in Hughey. The statute expressly provides: "Nothing in this
Act shall prevent any state agency or court from asserting jurisdiciton
under state law over any occupational safety and health issue with respect
to which no standard is in effect under Section 6. '" 81 But the OSH Act
clearly requires that a state go through a specific process to assert juris-
diction over an issue where a standard is in effect.8 2
The focus would thus be whether the state law under review was
"related to" the "issue" addressed by the federal standard. "Issue" has
been defined by OSHA as "an industrial, occupational, or hazard group-
ing which is at least as comprehensive as a corresponding grouping con-
tained in [the Occupational Safety and Health Standards].183 The initial
question then is whether the "issue" is all of hazard communication, or
hazard communication in the manufacturing sector only. If it encom-
passes all hazard communication, then the resolution is simple. Con-
gress has expressly preempted any state law "related to" the
communication of the hazardous effects of chemicals in any workplace
covered under the Act. "Related to" clearly implies more than just pre-
emption of parallel coverage. It would be difficult to argue that any state
"right to know" law is not related to the communication of hazardous
effects of chemicals in the workplace. Therefore, if the "issue" is hazard
communication in all workplaces, preemption of state right to know laws
is proper. On the other hand, if "issue" is narrowly defined and is lim-
ited to the communication in the manufacturing sector, state "right to
80 Id. at 1072-73.
81 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (1982). In a case involving the preemptive effect of the Federal Hazardous
Substance Act (FHSA) hazard labeling, Judge Friendly, for the Second Circuit, held that the FHSA
preempted a labeling requirment imposed by the City of New York on pressurized containers which
were stored, sold or used there. Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. Lowery, 452 F.2d 431 (2d
Cir. 1981). The court found the statute to be explicitly preemptive by virtue of an express statement
ofcongressional intent to supersede state and local labeling requirements with the FHSA. Id. at 437.
The court based its opinion on the explicit preemption clauses in the statute, but it also noted that
varying local and state labeling requirements for the hazardous substances addressed would place a
substantial burden on interstate commerce, a fact which was observed in the legislative history of the
FHSA. Id.
82 29 C.F.R. § 1902.2(c) (1986).
83 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Pendergrass. 819 F.2d 1263 (3d Cir. 1987).
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know" laws would fall only where they were "related to" the specifically
enumerated industrial sectors. Such arguments, whatever their merit,
will soon become moot, however, as the Third, Circuit has ordered
OSHA to expand the scope of the current hazard communication stan-
dard to include all workplaces.
IV. Conclusion
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the issue of federal preemp-
tion has seldom been one with bright lines and clear legal precedent.
The outcome of the various cases where the issue has arisen, it appears,
often turned more upon the facts of the case and the-philosophy of the
court than upon the application of precise legal principles. The Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration has been one of the most con-
troversial of the various federal regulatory agencies. It is not unlikely
that reviewing courts have allowed their own views of the effectiveness or
dedication of the agency to influence their interpretation of legal issues
which arise in litigation before them. This potential provides an addi-
tional basis for viewing the matter from what is perhaps the simpliest
approach.
The commerce clause arguments are heavily fact dependent, as are,
to a lesser extent, those based upon implied preemption. Express pre-
emption requires little factual developments, but does require an inter-
pretation of Congressional intent. While arguably determining what was
in the minds of members of Congress may be difficult, the language of
the statute itself is fairly clear and should be dispositive.
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